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Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This is a sad and rather
disappointing set of circumstances that will unfold before you
in the next several days. This is a case where a bank suddenly
withdrew the promised financing when it had plenty of collateral. This is a case where the bank withdrew money it had
promised was due even though it had nothing to lose when it
did it.'
So began the plaintiff's attorney in K.M.C. Co., Inc. v Irving
Trust Co., a prototypical example of a hard case making bad law.
Similar words uttered in courtrooms throughout the United States
signal the increasingly litigious nature of the lender-borrower relationship. K.M.C. and similar cases have established the liability of
lenders to both their borrowers and third parties under a variety of
legal theories2 including fraud,3 duress, 4 interference, 5 intentional
t A.B. 1979, Washington University; M.A. 1981, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1983,
Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1989, The University of Chicago.
I Plaintiff's opening statement at trial in K.M.C. Co., Inc. v Irving Trust Co., 757 F2d
752 (6th Cir 1985), quoted in Helen Davis Chaitman, David, Inc. v. Goliath NationalBank,
13 Litigation 32 (Summer 1987).
2 See generally 1-4 Emerging Theories of Lender Liability (ABA, 1985, 1987); Werner
F. Ebke and James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw L J 775 (1986); Lawrence F. Flick, II and Dennis Replansky, Liability of Banks
To Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 103 Bank L J 220 (1986); John 0. Tyler, Jr.,
Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Houston L Rev 411 (1987).
3 Sanchez-Coreav Bank of America, 38 Cal 3d 892, 701 P2d 826 (1985) (affirming jury
award of $1 million in punitive damages against bank for obtaining assignment of debtor's
accounts receivable in return for false representation that it would advance additional
funds); Stirling v Chemical Bank, 382 F Supp 1146 (S D NY 1974), aff'd 516 F2d 1396 (2d
Cir 1975) (cause of action for fraud against lenders for allegedly causing plaintiffs to resign
their positions as officers and directors of the debtor company by falsely representing that
they would make further loans).
4 PECOS Const. Co. v Mortgage Inv. Co., 80 NM 680, 459 P2d 842 (1969) (lender liable
for additional fee received at closing upon threat not to fund construction project); State
National Bank v Farah Manufacturing Co., 678 SW2d 661 (Tex App 1984) (bank's bad
faith threat to declare a default and accelerate payment unduly influenced election of company officers and directors). Farah demonstrates the expansion of the good faith doctrine
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infliction of emotional distress,6 various control theories, breach of
fiduciary duty,8 and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The success of borrower lawsuits, with jury verdicts frequently in the tens of millions of dollars, 9 has fed upon itself;

through its importation into the duress context.

5 Farah,678 SW2d 661 (Texas court expands common law doctrine of tortious interference with contractual relationship to interference with corporate debtor's governance); Melamed v Lake County National Bank, 727 F2d 1399 (6th Cir 1984) (cause of action for
tortious interference with corporate governance in bankruptcy where lender took actions
normally reserved for trustee).
' Ricci v Key Bancsharesof Maine, Inc., No 82-0249-P (D Me April 10, 1987). In Ricci,
the bank terminated line of credit based on a false rumor that the borrower was involved in
organized crime, ignored the borrower's denials, and refused to return his phone calls. The
$6 million awarded for emotional distress was part of a $15 million total damage award. The
case settled for $10 million. 1 Lender Liab L Rep 8 (Oct 1987).
7 Lenders who assume a controlling position over borrowers, whether or not pursuant to
the loan agreement, may be liable under several theories. One is tortious interference, discussed in note 5. Another is breach of fiduciary duty, discussed in note 8. In addition, a
controlling creditor may be liable to noncontrolling creditors of the borrower (A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v Cargill,Inc., 309 NW2d 285 (Minn 1981)), may be liable for the borrower's
torts (Conner v Great Western Savings & Loan Assoc., 69 Cal 2d 850, 447 P2d 609, (1968)),
and taxes (Commonwealth National Bank of Dallas v United States, 665 F2d 743 (5th Cir
1982)), and may have its claim equitably subordinated to other creditors in bankruptcy (In
re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr 470 (D Minn 1980); Taylor v Standard Gas & Elec. Co.,
306 US 307 (1939) ("Deep Rock")). See generally K. Thor Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor
in a Control Relationship with Its Debtor, 67 Marq L Rev 523 (1984).
Loan provisions calling for various forms of lender control over a borrower's business or
assets are a form of security. As the law imposes greater duties on lenders in control relationships, the use of control provisions in loan agreements declines. The protection of lender
interests therefore requires greater flexibility in other forms of security arrangements, such
as demand notes and specific default provisions. The law has moved in the opposite direction, however, increasing restrictions on lender behavior in all loan agreements.
8 The lender-borrower relationship does not, as a general rule, create a fiduciary duty.
CenterreBank of Kansas City v Distributors,Inc., 705 SW2d 42 (Mo App 1985); Dolton v
Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 642 P2d 21 (Colo App 1981). However, several recent cases have found a fiduciary relationship where there has been a long-term course of
dealings between the borrower and the lender, and the borrower has placed trust and confidence in the lender's financial advice. Barrett v Bank of America, 183 Cal App 3d 1362, 229
Cal Rptr 16 (1986); Hooper v Barnett Bank of West Florida,474 S2d 1253 (Fla App 1985);
Deist v Wachholz, 678 P2d 188 (Mont 1984). A fiduciary duty may also be imposed on
lenders who exert control over a borrower's business or assets. In re Process-Manz Press,
Inc., 236 F Supp 333 (N D Ill 1964), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 369 F2d 513 (7th Cir
1966); In re American Lumber Co., 7 Bankr 519 (Bankr D Minn 1979).
In lender liability suits, borrowers who establish a fiduciary duty on the part of the
lender have an easier case to make in establishing lender misconduct. Among other things,
the fiduciary lender must meet a much more stringent standard of good faith than that
required in the usual lender-borrower relationship. This comment will consider good faith
requirements only in the non-fiduciary setting.
I Two recent cases, involving compensatory damages only, have resulted in awards of
over $100 million. FDIC v Scharenberg, No 84-2712 (S D Fla 1987) ($105 million); Penthouse Int'l v Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan, 665 F Supp 301 (S D NY 1987) ($130 million
award handed down by judge sitting without a jury). The Penthouse judgment was subse-
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"lender liability" has become the buzzword for a new branch of
commercial law. There is a climate of uncertainty among lenders,
who realistically must believe that any acceleration, foreclosure, or
refusal to continue funding a loan is likely to result in a lawsuit.
Quite naturally, this increased cost of doing business will be felt by
borrowers as well, through greater difficulty in obtaining loans,
higher interest rates, and less flexible credit arrangements.
Breach of the covenant of good faith has been a particularly
prevalent claim in lender liability suits. No doubt much of this
popularity can be traced to the vague and moralistic nature of the
concepts "good" and "bad" faith. In recent years, courts have
given an expansive interpretation to good faith performance in
borrower lawsuits. As a result of apparently inconsistent court decisions and an expanding scope of liability, lenders find themselves
uncertain as to the standard of behavior the law requires. In the
words of one commentator, good faith has become a "loose cannon" that the courts have used "to further their views of justice."'"
Two frequently cited federal cases are especially troublesome.
In Brown v Avemco Investment Corp.," a Ninth Circuit panel held
that the UCC imposes a good faith requirement on specific default
provisions, such as due-on-sale clauses. The option to foreclose or
accelerate following a specific default may be exercised only if the
lender also has a good faith belief that the loan is insecure. 2 In
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v Irving Trust Co.,' 3 a Sixth Circuit panel found
that, despite a demand provision in the loan agreement calling for
repayment at any time upon demand, Irving had a good faith obligation to notify K.M.C. before Irving discontinued funding a line
of credit.' 4 The court rejected Irving's argument that a good faith
notice requirement was inconsistent with its right to repayment on
demand. Citing Brown, the court stated that a demand provision,
like a general insecurity or specific default clause, is subject to a
good faith standard of reasonableness and fairness. 5
The problem with the Brown and K.M.C. decisions is not their
results as much as the unnecessary expansion of legal principles
used to reach them. In each case, the lender exhibited egregious

quently reversed by the Court of Appeals. 1988 US App LEXIS 11877 (2d Cir).
O William D. Warren, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Emerging
Theories of Lender Liability 58 (ABA, 1985).
" 603 F2d 1367 (9th Cir 1979).
" Id at 1375.
757 F2d 752 (6th Cir 1985).
Id at 759.
Id at 760.
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behavior, making its case rather unsympathetic. 16 Both courts
might have found for plaintiffs under established principles of
waiver or estoppel, without expansion of the requirements of good
faith performance. Demand notes and specific default provisions
are tools by which lenders and borrowers allocate the risks of uncertainty. These provisions allow lenders to reduce their costs of
gathering information, shift the risks of price changes, and avoid
the costs of litigation. Such reduced costs are passed on in the
form of better contract terms for the borrower. By imposing a good
faith obligation in this context, courts upset the reasonable expectations of the parties and significantly limit the flexibility available
to lenders and borrowers in furtherance of commercial transactions. Rather than using more narrowly defined rules that might
allow consumers of the law to order their behavior, the Brown and
K.M.C. courts have applied an increasingly ill-defined standard to
overrule the express terms of a contract.
This comment is specifically concerned with the concept of
good faith performance in commercial lending. From a broader
perspective, good faith in lender liability will be treated as a case
study of good faith contract performance in general. The comment
analyzes the various conceptions of good faith embraced by the
UCC and several commentators, and then examines how these conceptions might apply in the context of contracts to loan money.
Finally, a critical appraisal of K.M.C., Brown, and related decisions
leads to a series of recommendations about the use of the good
faith performance doctrine in commercial lending cases, and more
generally in contract disputes.
It is the thesis of this comment that good faith performance,
particularly in the context of lender liability, is a dangerous and
unnecessary doctrine that unjustifiably restricts freedom of contract and creates a needless presumption that allows judges and
juries to substitute their conceptions of reasonableness and fairness for those of parties more knowledgeable about the realities of
the market. The inconsistent application of the good faith doctrine
to lending practices adds uncertainty and other costs to business
transactions in abrogation of the fundamental purposes of commercial law.

16 See text at notes 59 and 79 for details of these cases.

What's So Good About Good Faith?

1988]

I.

1339

THE NATURE OF GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE

A. The UCC
The concept of good faith is ubiquitous in contract law. It is
important, therefore, to distinguish what Allan Farnsworth describes as the two senses of good faith.17 The first is generally concerned with good faith purchase:
Here "good faith" is used to describe a state of mind: A party
is advantaged only if he acted with innocent ignorance or lack
of suspicion. This meaning of "good faith" is very close to that
of lack of notice."'
This sense of good faith is intended, for example, in UCC § 3302(1)(b), 19 requiring that a holder in due course of an instrument
take in good faith, i.e., in the honest belief that the paper is valid.2 0
The second sense of good faith is good faith performance:
In this sense "good faith" has nothing to do with a state of
mind-with innocence, suspicion, or notice. Here the inquiry
goes to decency,
fairness or reasonableness in performance or
21
enforcement.
Good faith performance is most commonly required where a contract contains an open quantity or price term, or is subject to conditions in the control of one party. Requirements and output contracts are typical examples.22 In the loan context, good faith
performance will generally apply to refusals to honor lending com17 E. Allan Farnsworth,
Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U Chi L Rev 666 (1963).
18Id at 668.
19 Uniform Commercial Code Official Text With Comments (West, 1978). Subsequent

references to the Uniform Commercial Code refer to the Official Text, unless otherwise
indicated.
10 Prior to the adoption of the UCC there had been a long-standing dispute as to
whether the good faith standard for holders in due course was subjective or objective. The
drafters of the UCC, after experimenting with an objective test in the 1952 draft, adopted
the present provision in 1957, apparently intending to resolve the dispute in favor of a subjective test. James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 14-6 at 563 (West, 2d ed 1980); Alan Schwartz and Robert E.
Scott, Commercial Transactions:Principles and Policies 975 (Foundation, 1982). But see
Neil 0. Littlefield, Good FaithPurchase of Consumer Paper:The Failure of the Subjective
Test, 39 S Cal L Rev 48 (1966), for an argument that a subjective test is often inappropriate
in holder in due course cases, and that courts do not always use it.
2 Farnsworth, 30 U Chi L Rev at 668 (cited in note 17).
" UCC § 2-306(1) states, in relevant part:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of
the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith ....
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mitments, refusals to make loans and advances, accelerations, and
foreclosures.2
Farnsworth's definition of good faith performance, including
notions of "decency, fairness, and reasonableness," is partially consistent with the UCC's definition of good faith performance. Section 2-103(b) of the Code defines good faith "in the case of a
merchant" to mean "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." This definition is applicable to § 2-305 on open price terms and § 2-306 on
output and requirements contracts, among others. More generally,
§ 2-311(1) requires that any provision under a sales contract leaving performance to be specified by one of the parties must be made
"in good faith and within the limits set by commercial
reasonableness."
The UCC commercial reasonableness definition of good faith
applies only to Article 2-Sales, and within Article 2 only to
merchants. Section 1-203, in the Code's General Provisions, states:
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." Section 1-201(19)
defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."
The drafters of the Code explicitly rejected application of reasonable commercial standards to good faith in all commercial
agreements. Section 1-201(18) of the May 1949 draft of the UCC
reads:
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all
prior parties and observance by a person of the reasonable
commercial standards of any business or trade in which he is
engaged.
The ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law recommended that the objective reasonableness standard be dropped,
and good faith limited to the absence of dishonesty, trickery, deceit, or improper purpose.2 4 It argued that commercial reasonableness was too vague and evolutionary a standard in many contexts
23 See generally Michael L. Weissman, Lender Liability: The Obligation to Act in Good
Faith and Deal Fairly, 69 J Comm Bank Lending 2 (December, 1986); Note, K.M.C. Co. v
Irving Trust Co.: DiscretionaryFinancingand the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw U L
Rev 539 (1987); Note, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons
of Liabilityfor FinancialInstitutions?40 Vand L Rev 1197 (1987); Comment, Lender Liability for Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 Emory'L J 917 (1987).
24 Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus Law 113, 128 (1951).
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to be of any practical use. Adoption of such a standard might diminish flexibility in commercial transactions:
[T]he phrase "observance of reasonable commercial standards" carries with it the implication of usages, customs or
practices. If this is true there immediately arises the very difficult problem of what usages, customs or practices are those
intended to be included in the standard. Any lawyer who has
ever attempted to prove what a usage or custom is will immediately recognize how litigious such a standard could grow to
be. More serious still is the possibility that "reasonable commercial standards" could mean usage, customs or practices existing at any particular time. This could have the very bad
effect of freezing customs and practices into particular molds
and thereby destroy the flexibility absolutely essential to the
gradual evolution of commercial practices.25
The Code drafters subsequently dropped the reasonableness standard from their general definition of good faith, leaving only the
subjective "honesty in fact" standard.28 Objective reasonableness
tests were relegated to specific Code provisions, primarily in Article 2.
The rejection of an objective test in § 1-203 and its addition to
other sections of the Code creates a "negative implication that § 1201(19) deals only with dishonesty. 2 7 The legislative history of the
Code reveals that the drafters intended to move away from a moralistic conception of commercial law apparent in the 1949 draft.28
The new general definition of good faith signaled a "clear rejection
of 'commercial decencies' as an unnecessarily broad, moralistic imperative. '2 It seems, therefore, that the UCC imposes no general
obligation of commercial reasonableness outside of Article 2.
Nonetheless, one must also consider UCC § 1-102(3):
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreeId.
Despite disagreement as to how to interpret the drafters' rejection of the commercial
reasonableness standard, there seems little doubt that "honesty in fact" is itself a subjective
test. Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum
L Rev 798, 812 (1958) ("this 'subjective' test, sometimes known as the rule of 'the pure heart
and the empty head' "); Farnsworth, 30 U Chi L Rev at 671 (cited in note 17); La Sara
Grain Co. v First National Bank of Mercedes, 673 SW2d 558, 563 (Tex 1984).
27 Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va L Rev 195, 214 n 69 (1968).
28 Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligationof Good Faith, 1981 Duke L J 619,
624, citing Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 83-86 (Yale, 1977).
29 Gillette, 1981 Duke L J at 624.
"

26
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ment, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except
that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to
be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
This provision apparently requires that good faith behavior must,
at a minimum, be "not manifestly unreasonable."
There is a distinction, however, between a proscription against
"not manifestly unreasonable" behavior, and a requirement that
all contract performance behavior meet "reasonable commercial
standards." "Manifestly unreasonable" is more akin to "unconscionable," or "the result of overreaching." A broader reading of
these terms would be inconsistent with the UCC's general presumption that parties to an informed freely-entered agreement
may set their own terms, as long as the interests of innocent third
parties are protected. For example, even under the stricter good
faith requirements of Article 2, § 2-309(3) creates a presumption
that the other party receive "reasonable notification" prior to contract termination, but allows the notification requirement to be
dispensed with by agreement if such a dispensation would not be
"unconscionable."
B. Communitarians and Abolitionists
Robert Summers criticizes the UCC precisely because its definition of good faith is not "open-ended." 30 The drafters of the
UCC, he says, were concerned with subjective dishonesty in § 1203, and attempted to deal with nondishonest forms of bad
faith-requiring an objective test-through specific provisions, primarily in Article 2. Summers contends that the drafters thereby
overlooked, and the UCC does not cover, many forms of
nondishonest bad faith.31
Farnsworth also believes that § 1-203 applies only to subjective honesty, and that the good faith requirement of the UCC was
thereby "enfeebled.

3

2

Because the drafters of the UCC were pri-

marily concerned with good faith in Farnsworth's first sense (good
faith purchase), they allowed good faith performance (the second
1oSummers,

54 Va L Rev at 215 (cited in note 27).

Id at 210-15.
Farnsworth, 30 U Chi L Rev at 674 (cited in note 17).
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sense) to appear only in specific provisions, thereby undermining
the status of good faith performance as an "overriding" or "supereminent" principle.3 s
Summers's and Farnsworth's critical attitude toward the narrow reach of the general good faith obligation under the UCC may
be described as communitarian; they believe that the duty to perform in good faith should be a broad obligation derived from objective community standards of fairness and decency. In contrast,
abolitionists, such as the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking
and Business Law (at least in 1951), would abolish any general reasonableness good faith requirement, and limit its scope to subjective honesty in fact, leaving reasonableness requirements to be imposed only in specific circumstances.
The communitarian position, represented in the works of
Summers,34 Farnsworth, 5 Stephen Burton," and B.J. Reiter,3 7 is

3 Id.

Summers argues that good faith is a "pervasively relevant [concept] in contracting
contexts," that defies a single definition, though it is generally concerned with decency, fairness, and reasonableness. Summers, 54 Va L Rev at 263 (cited in note 27); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-ItsRecognition and Conceptualization,67 Cornell
L Rev 810, 826 (1982). He criticizes the UCC definition because there are many "forms of
bad faith that do not involve dishonesty, let alone negligence-for example, openly abusing
the power to break off negotiations, openly taking unfair advantage of bargaining power,
openly acting capriciously or openly undercutting another's performance." Summers, 54 Va
L Rev at 210. Summers praises the Restatement definition, but favors an "excluder" conception of good faith that rules out a wide range of heterogeneous context-dependent forms
of bad faith. The obvious vagueness of this conception is circumvented, he argues, by the
adoption of more specific rules in particular contexts. The "pervasiveness" of good faith
serves to motivate these rules. Summers's conception is useful, however, only to the extent
that it does produce a consistent body of rules by which consumers of law can organize their
behavior.
3' Farnsworth explains that applications of the general obligation of good faith result
"in an implied term of the contract requiring cooperation on the part of one party to the
contract so that another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations." Farnsworth, 30 U Chi L Rev at 669 (cited in note 17). In pressing his case for an objective good
faith standard, Farnsworth stresses that the good faith standard should be "based on the
decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community and not on the individual's own beliefs as to what might be decent, fair or reasonable." Id at 672.
" Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 Harv L Rev 369 (1980); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Iowa L Rev 1 (1981);
Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor
Summers, 69 Iowa L Rev 497 (1984). Like other communitarians, Burton defines good faith
in terms of the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties. Bad faith, he says, is the
exercise of discretion to recapture opportunities foregone upon entering into the contract.
Thus, for example, when parties enter into an agreement leaving the price term open, it is
reasonably expected that the price-fixing party has foregone the opportunity to set the price
at anything drastically different from that determined by the market. Under Burton's
scheme there is an objective reasonableness standard with regard to expectations, but courts
34
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best exemplified by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Restatement § 205 counsels that a duty of good faith and fair dealing
should be imposed in the performance and enforcement of every
contract. Comment a to § 205 recites:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving
"bad faith" because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness."
To communitarians, good faith is a "substantial element of what
constitutes reasonable expectations,"3 9 and these expectations are
derived from relevant community standards; they are the background understanding upon which all contracts are formed.
Abolitionists do not deny the role of reasonable expectations
in contract interpretation, but rather question the value of a blanket provision imposing community standards on every contract.
The ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law outlined two primary difficulties with such a provision: 1) community
standards are often vague, leading to excessive litigation over their
application; and 2) commercial standards, or at least those of the
contracting parties, may evolve more quickly than those adhered
to by the courts, and the rigid application of outmoded standards
will stifle such evolution.40
Clayton Gillette has also argued that the good faith obligation
will have to inquire into the subjective intent of the discretion-exercising party to determine
whether it was indeed attempting to recapture foregone opportunities. Burton, 69 Iowa L
Rev at 503. This subjective good faith is much closer to the UCC's "honesty in fact."
Burton's analysis has the distinction of being the most limited in scope of the communitarian conceptions. Because the court must find both a violation of reasonable expectations
and the subjective intent to violate, there will be fewer cases in which the good faith obligation will be applied to proscribe conduct. Beyond this, "foregone opportunity" analysis
seems to add little to the general concept that a contracting party must not act so as to
violate the reasonable expectations of the other party. After all, the opportunities foregone
by a contracting party are those within the reasonable expectations of the parties. Will it be
any easier, or involve any different inquiries, for a court to determine what opportunities
were foregone than for a court to determine the other party's reasonable expectations?
17 B.J. Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 Valp U L Rev 705 (1983). Reiter's is perhaps the most extreme communitarian theory of good faith. Reiter views good faith as part
of the moral basis of contracts. In this view, contracts are not only an end but also a means
of achieving more fundamental social goals. Id at 717. Contracts must therefore be constrained if the goals are to be reached.
38Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205 comment a (1981).
39Reiter, 17 Valp U L Rev at 714 (cited in note 37).
40 See ABA quotation in text at note 25.
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should be limited to subjective honesty in fact.4 In addition to the
problems identified by the ABA, Gillette insists that the vagueness
of the good faith standard will lead to judicial inconsistency and
misapplication that will override the freely-entered agreement of
the parties.42 Most important, an expansive interpretation of good
faith, allowing the judiciary to "'do justice' in particular cases"
"introduces an element of uncertainty that is likely to increase
risks and raise costs at the contract formation stage."4 3 Gillette
maintains that the benefits from a good faith prohibition on dishonesty are worth the costs in interpretation and administration,
but the benefits of a broader, objective reading of good faith are
not, since existing equitable and common law doctrine is sufficient
to handle those cases where good faith as community standards
might be applied.""
C. The Reification of Community Standards
The differences between the two positions on good faith may
be best understood against a background of commonly held principles of contract interpretation. Absent fraud or other forms of illegality, the parties to an informed, freely-entered agreement should
be able to set their own terms, and the explicit terms of the contract should be controlling in any subsequent dispute. When a dispute arises over the meaning of the contract, the court examines
the contract, and any other evidence permitted by the parol evidence rule, to determine the intentions of the parties. The court
interprets the contract in line with the reasonable expectations of
the parties. Reasonable expectations are an objective standard derived from the relevant community in which the parties formed
and performed the contract. Reasonable expectations are the background understanding informing the terms of every contract.45
41 Gillette, 1981 Duke L J at 619 (cited in note 28).
42 Id at 643-49.

Id at 650-51.
Id at 627, 632.
"That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the
making of a promise." Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbinon Contracts § 1 at 2 (West, 1963); "In
order to determine the legal meaning of a contract or agreement, a 'standard of interpretation' must first be established, that is, the criterion by which the meaning of the language
and other manifestations of intention of the parties is to be ascertained. ... The standard
most applicable to a bilateral transaction would seem to be that of reasonable expectation,
that is, the sense in which the party using the words should reasonably have apprehended
that they would be understood by the other party." Walter H. E. Jaeger, 4 Williston on
Contracts § 603 at 334, 344-45 (Baker, Voorhis, 3d ed 1961) (footnotes omitted).
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These principles of interpretation are fundamental to contract
law irrespective of any conception of good faith; the dispute over
the meaning of good faith derives essentially from the indeterminacy of language. Given that it is possible to read a contract so as
to permit or proscribe virtually any behavior, the question is when
a court should be willing to move away from the contract itself and
look to community standards of reasonableness, decency, and fairness. It is a disagreement over the strength of the presumption to
be given to the explicit terms of the contract. In the end it is a
debate over the relative competence of courts and parties to determine what is reasonable.
This comment takes the position that the communitarian conception of good faith performance is dangerous because it represents a reification of community standards." By giving the general
background understanding a label, and reading it explicitly into
every contract, as in Restatement § 205, the communitarians have
shifted the presumption decidedly away from the text of the
contract.
A communitarian conception of good faith is problematic not
in theory, where it is consistent with basic principles of contract
interpretation, but in practice. A fundamental consequence of the
principles of contract interpretation outlined above4 7 is that good
faith, even under a communitarian conception, may never be used
to override the express terms of a contract.4" The enforcement of
the duty to perform in good faith is enforcement of the background understanding that is properly an aid to interpretation of

46

An early use of the good faith performance doctrine provides an excellent example of

its reifying function. Under Roman law, the magistrate in contract disputes bad to request
that the court compel the defendant to perform for the plaintiff ex fide bona-in accordance
with good faith. By reciting these magic words, cases outside the very limited jurisdiction of
the Roman civil law could be brought before the court, thereby allowing the judge to apply a
number of rules derived from the customary commercial practices of the day. Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 Current Legal Problems 16, 19-21 (1956).
47 See note 45 and accompanying text.
418A subsidiary consequence of this conception of good faith is that if community standards change, a court must interpret a contract not in line with the new standards, but
consistent with the background understanding that formed the reasonable expectations of
the parties at the time the contract was formed (unless the court deems that a modification
has occurred). Thus, for example, in imposing a good faith obligation on an employment-atwill contract in Monge v Beebe Rubber Co., 114 NH 130, 316 A2d 549, 551 (1974), the argument of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that "[t]he law governing the relations between
employer and employee has ... evolved over the years to reflect changing legal, social, and
economic conditions," was misplaced if these conditions had changed during the six years of
the plaintiff's employment.
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contract terms, not a term in and of itself.49 The danger in reifying
community standards is that it turns the notion of a freely-entered
agreement on its head, creating a presumption to look beyond the
express terms of the contract. As a result, good faith doctrine, particularly in lender liability cases, has added uncertainty to the law,
making it more likely that courts will override contract terms
based on their own conceptions of decency and fairness.
One might argue that "good faith" reification is no more dangerous than the use of "reasonable expectations," which is itself a
label for the background understanding. The difference is that
"reasonable expectations" properly connotes that it is the expectations of the parties that are preeminent in contract interpretation;
community standards are relevant to the extent they indicate what
the parties to the contract must have meant. "Good faith," on the
other hand, turns community standards into a thing, an implied
term that appears in every contract. Community standards should
aid contract interpretation where meaning is ambiguous; a communitarian conception of good faith makes it too easy for judges and
juries to look to community standards in every case, even when the
intentions of the parties are clear from the face of the document or
from other evidence. Communitarians and abolitionists differ fundamentally in their willingness to give judges and juries another
tool with which to police agreements.
As with most scholarly disputes, the disagreement about the
proper scope of good faith takes place at the margins. Notwithstanding the indeterminacy of language, most behavior tends either to fall clearly within the language of the contract and thus
within the contract terms, or clearly outside the language of the
contract, and therefore within the province of community standards. The classic examples of the duty to perform in good faith
fall within the latter category. These examples include contracts
with open price terms, output and requirements contracts, and
contracts in which the specification of certain conditions is under
the control of one party. In these cases courts must look to community standards (the reasonable expectations of the parties)
rather than allow any price or any demand or specification to bind

19 Some of the more extreme communitarians, such as Reiter and Summers, might not
agree with this characterization of the communitarian position. They might argue that the
good faith obligation does indeed empower a court to override the terms of a contract where
standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness dictate. The argument that good faith as
the reification of community standards is an unnecessary exercise in discretion by judge and
jury applies with even greater force to this more expansive conception of good faith.
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the other party. At the low end there must be some price, output,
or demand if the contract is not to fail for want of consideration.
At the high end, some prices and demands may be so great as to be
beyond the reasonable expectation of any party. (This is what is
meant by opportunistic behavior.) The UCC thus imposes a duty
on the parties to such a contract to set the price, or the demand or
specification, in good faith. In each case, good faith is qualified in
terms of "reasonableness" or "market price. '
The good faith "reification" in these cases is merely a shorthand for an interpretational principle over which there is no dispute. The background understanding in open-price, open-output
and requirements contracts is clear enough that the law can reduce
transaction costs by codifying these expectations. It is cheaper for
those rare actors who really intend an open price term to be within
one party's complete discretion to specify that intention explicitly
than for everyone else to specify the reasonable limitations on their
open price terms. However, there seems to be no purpose served by
the Code's use of the term "good faith" in these cases, where the
term "reasonable" will do just as well.
The drafters of the UCC restricted the use of good faith as
reasonableness to specific provisions within the Code rather than
10

UCC § 2-305(2) specifies:
A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good

faith.
Comment 3 explains:
Good faith includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade if the party is a merchant. (Section 2-103). But in the normal case a "posted
price" or a future seller's or buyer's "given price," "price in effect," "market price," or
the like satisfies the good faith requirement.
§ 2-306 places the reasonableness requirement directly in the text of the statute:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of
the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except
that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.
Query whether "good faith" adds anything to the meaning of this section. Comment 2 further explains:
... the party who will determine quantity is required to operate his plant or conduct
his business in good faith and according to commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade so that his output or requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable
figure.
Similarly, § 2-311(1):
An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently definite ...to be a contract is not
made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one
of the parties. Any such specification must be made in good faith and within limits set
by commercial reasonableness.
Again, what does the expression "good faith" add here?
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creating a supereminent principle. Farnsworth, Summers, and
other communitarians criticize this "enfeebled" good faith requirement of the UCC because it does not create a sufficient presumption to look to community standards in other cases. The abolitionists counter that the inability of the courts to define
reasonableness with sufficient clarity in other circumstances imposes costs of uncertainty that outweigh any moral advantage that
might accrue from further intrusion into freedom of contract.
Rather than engage in further abstract discussion, it is perhaps
best at this point to turn to specific examples of contract performance behavior and assess the effects in each case of the reification
of community standards as a duty to perform in good faith. Our
examples come from loan contracts.

II.
A.

GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE IN LOAN CONTRACTS

The Commercial Lending Market

Perhaps the only generality about the lending of money to
businesses that may be made with certainty is that it allows of almost no generalities. An essential characteristic of commercial
lending is that each situation is unique, requiring individualized
solutions. Among the myriad factors that will vary from loan to
loan are the borrower's monetary needs, the period over which the
loan will be available, the conditions under which it will be available, and the period and other terms of repayment. There will also
be variability in the loanworthiness of the borrower, the creditor's
costs of obtaining information about the borrower's loanworthiness, the availability of security (whether real property or chattels), and the existence of other secured and unsecured creditors of
the borrower who may have superior property rights. To these normal complexities of the lending relationship must be added the
present volatility in the lending market caused by frequent bank
failures, rapid fluctuations in prices and interest rates, deregulation of banks, and the growth of interstate banking. 51
Complex problems call for variegated and innovative solutions,
for a plethora of lending tools including both secured and unsecured open lines of credit, transaction loans, working capital
5! FDIC Chairman Predicts Sizeable Increase in Bank Closings in 1987 Over Record
Level in 1986, NY Times, § 4 at 17 (Jan 22, 1987); H. Helmut Loring and James M. Brundy,
The Deregulation of Banks, 42 Wash & Lee L Rev 347 (1985); Nancy Dunnan, The Wild
World of Interstate Banking, 71 ABA J 54 (Nov 1985); Helen R. Friedli, Changing Times in
Interstate Banking, 1986 Colum Bus L Rev 97.
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loans, revolving credit, and term loans and leases.52 The distinctions both within and between these categories stem from differences in the cost to creditors of obtaining information about the
borrower, creditors' security, and the consequent allocation of risks
between the parties.
The key to the credit decision is information. The relevant information has been characterized as the three C's of credit: Character, Capacity, and Capital.53 "Character is an inner quality and
not something worn as a visible garment."5' 4 It requires for its assessment not only a personal interview, but an extensive background check. "Capacity is the ability of those who manage a business to manage it successfully."5 5 A background check, albeit of a
different sort, is also necessary here. "Capital refers to the finances
available for the operation of a business."56
This information is relevant both at the time of the initial
credit decision and at subsequent decisions to continue funding or
accelerate payment, that is, during contract performance. The annals of lending are filled with stories of lenders who, to their eventual chagrin, continued to lend money with insufficient information
about the borrower.5 That such information is difficult to gather is
a fact of commercial life; all credit decisions must be made with
less than ideal levels of information.
In a world of zero information costs, a borrower would reasonably expect a lender to call a loan only when the expected loss
from default exceeds the expected benefit from repayment. But
such an assessment requires information, and in this world gathering information is costly. Because these costs will be passed on to
the borrower as less favorable interest or repayment terms, the
parties may negotiate to reach another solution. The lender may be
allowed greater discretion in the decision to accelerate payment
(i.e., it may be allowed to make the decision based on less information) in exchange for more favorable interest or other terms for the
borrower. This is at least part of the explanation for demand notes
52 See generally Douglas A. Hayes, Bank Lending Policies:Domestic and International
105-129 (Michigan, 2d ed 1977); Herbert V. Prochnow, ed, Bank Credit 116-137, 189-218,
236-247, 289-300 (Harper & Row, 1981).
53 William H. Bryan, The Banker and the Credit Decision, in Prochnow, Bank Credit
at 2.
54

Id.

55 Id.

5"Id at 3.
11 See, for example, Spilled Milk: A Special Collection from The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending on Loans that Went Sour (Robert Morris, 1985).
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and specific default provisions such as due-on-sale clauses: the borrower agrees that the lender may call the loan based either on its
complete discretion or with only the very limited information that
the collateral has been sold, and the lender agrees to interest and
repayment terms more favorable to the borrower.
Even when the lender has gathered the best possible information, loans will vary in the degree to which the lender feels secure
about repayment. Which is to say that information about future
events is never perfect; there will always be uncertainty as to
whether the loan will be repaid. When uncertainty is high, lenders
will demand high interest rates and quick repayment, or may refuse to fund altogether. Another explanation for demand notes and
specific default provisions is that they allow lenders to reduce their
uncertainty in exchange for better contract terms for the borrower.
This uncertainty includes not only fear of default, but uncertainty
about the outcome of future litigation. One of the reasons lenders
require demand notes and specific default provisions is to avoid
the cost of later trying to justify acceleration decisions in court.
Because lenders avoid these costs, borrowers get better loan terms.
The complexities of commercial lending necessitate individualized solutions. Demand notes, due-on-sale clauses, and other provisions that move away from a strict rule of reasonable belief in a
loan's insecurity are tools by which lenders and borrowers reach
agreement; they represent an agreed-upon allocation of risks in a
complicated market. When courts limit the flexibility with which
these tools may be used, parties must live with inefficient allocations of risks and benefits. Further, the costs to all contracting parties are likely to become more uniform. To the extent that lenders
are unable to distinguish between good and bad risks at the time
of contract formation, cross-subsidization will ensue. As all borrowers are offered similar lending terms, lower risk borrowers, who
under a more flexible system might achieve more favorable terms,
are in effect subsidizing higher risk borrowers, who might be subject to discretionary demand or default provisions in a world without court-imposed terms.
B.

Good Faith in Lender Liability

The preceding section presents a brief sketch of the background understanding of loan contracts to which a communitarian
conception of good faith should refer. Unfortunately, this has often
not been the case in the application of good faith in lender liability. The next two sections examine in detail two principal areas of
lender liability law.

1352

The University of Chicago Law Review

1.

[55:1335

Demand notes and notice.

In K.M.C. Co., Inc. v Irving Trust Co.,58 Irving refused, without notice, to continue funding a discretionary line of credit, ultimately leading to the collapse of K.M.C. The jury found that Irving had breached the loan agreement, and a Sixth Circuit panel
affirmed. Irving's behavior towards K.M.C. was particularly egregious: the loan was adequately secured at all times; the bank had
regularly covered K.M.C.'s overdrafts via the line of credit in the
past; the bank failed to live up to its policy of giving notice before
acceleration of loans; the bank officer knew that failure to cover
the check would be disastrous to K.M.C.'s business; and the bank's
decision not to continue funding was apparently motivated by a
personality conflict between the bank officer and K.M.C.'s president.5 9 Based on these facts, the court upheld the magistrate's jury
instructions regarding the obligation of good faith. Drawing an
analogy from Section 2-309 of the UCC's sales provisions, requiring
reasonable notification before termination of an ongoing contractual relationship, the court held that Irving had a good faith obligation to notify K.M.C. before discontinuing funding, despite the
express provisions of the line of credit agreement.6 0 The court rejected Irving's argument that a good faith notice requirement was
inconsistent with its right, under the loan agreement, to repayment
on demand. Citing UCC § 1-208, the court stated in dictum that a
demand provision, like a general insecurity or specific default
clause, is subject to a good faith standard of reasonableness and
fairness."
UCC § 1-208 provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest
may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral
or additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself
insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to
mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the
party against whom the power has been exercised.
The § 1-208 rule is consistent with the reasonable expectations
of parties to an agreement containing an insecurity clause. "When
757 F2d 752 (6th Cir 1985).
Tyler, 24 Houston L Rev at 418 (cited in note 2).
60K.M.C., 757 F2d at 759.
81 Id at 760.
"
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he deems himself insecure" must mean at least when the party has
an honest belief in insecurity, and not merely "whenever he feels
like it." Section 1-208 thereby gives effect to the words of the
contract.
The issue of whether the good faith standard in § 1-208 is subjective or objective is unresolved. The official comment makes reference to the "honesty in fact" standard of § 1-201(19), and several
courts have held that the good faith in § 1-208 depends only on the
accelerating party's actual mental state.2 Other courts seem to
favor some form of reasonableness standard,63 and Grant Gilmore
believes that § 1-208 means the "creditor has the right to accelerate if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable man, motivated by
'
good faith, would have done so. "64
The objectivists seem to have the better of the argument here.
If "when he deems himself to be insecure" is to mean nothing more
than "when he honestly deems himself to be insecure," § 1-208 is
superfluous; § 1-203 and § 1-201(19) already work to impose an
honesty in fact requirement on all contracts. Moreover, without an
objective reasonableness standard, § 1-208 imposes the nearly impossible burden of proving the other party's subjective state of
mind.
In the end, however, the debate is mostly irrelevant, as an objective and subjective standard will often reach the same result in
practice. "[T]he operational effect of the standard applied must be
measured by the results reached rather than the incantations of
priests."6 5 Regardless of the standard applied, the party with the
burden of proof will submit objective evidence tending to demonstrate that there were no reasonable grounds for insecurity. The
inquiry will be whether the lender, faced with certain information
regarding the security of the loan, could have believed it was insecure; whether the belief is characterized as "honest" or "reasona62 See, for example, Karner v Willis, 238 Kan 246, 710 P2d 21 (1985); Van Bibber v
Norris, 275 Ind 555, 419 NE2d 115, 122, 124 (1981); Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v State
Bank, 236 NW2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1975); Fort Knox National Bank v Gustafson, 385 SW2d
196, 200 (Ky App 1964).
63 See, for example, K.M.C., 757 F2d at 761; Brown v Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F2d 1367,
1376 (1979); Williamson v Wanlass, 545 P2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1976); Universal C.LT.
Credit Corp. v Shepler, 164 Ind App 516, 329 NE2d 620, 623-24, 626 (1975); Sheppard
Federal Credit Union v Palmer,408 F2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir 1969).
- Grant Gilmore, 2 Security Interests in Personal Property § 43.4 at 1197 (Little,
Brown, 1965).
65 James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 26-3 at 1090 (West, 2d ed 1980) (arguing that the result of most cases
would be the same under either standard).
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ble" is probably inconsequential. 6 Indeed, even among the courts
purporting to use a subjective test, the evidence cited goes to the
67
question of reasonable grounds for insecurity.
While the application of some form of good faith standard to a
general insecurity provision is noncontroversial, the justification
for § 1-208's imposition of good faith on "at will" language is unclear. The official comment explains that § 1-208 is intended to
give effect to clauses that "seemingly grant[] the power of an acceleration at the whim and caprice of one party." The good faith
standard is imposed so that such clauses will not "be held to make
the agreement void as against public policy or to make the contract
illusory or too indefinite for enforcement. . . ." This concern seems
more appropriate for "at will" language than for clauses that impose an "insecurity" condition. The official comment continues:
"Obviously this section has no application to demand instruments
or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time with or
without reason." If the drafters of the UCC were worried about "at
will" acceleration clauses because they might work to void the contract, why did they clearly exempt demand notes, under which repayment surely depends on the "whim and caprice" of one of the
parties, from the good faith requirement? One possibility is the
ubiquity of demand notes. When parties agree that acceleration
may be at the "whim and caprice" of the creditor, general commercial practice requires that they use a separate demand note to effectuate their intentions. Thus, the expectations of the parties are
clear, the creditor may call the loan "at will." On the other hand,
the reasonable expectation (the background understanding) of parties who merely include an insecurity clause in a larger loan agreement is that the clause imposes some conditions on the lender's
ability to call the loan. One must still question why the words "at
will" would be used in the context of an insecurity clause. 8

"

Of course, given the vagueness of the good faith concept, it may often be misapplied,
regardless of the precise standard used. In First National Bank in Libby v Twombly, 689
P2d 1226, 1228-30, 213 Mont 66 (1984), it was established at trial that Twombly approached
the bank regarding conversion of a promissory note because he was concerned that he
wouldn't be able to make the payment when due. Nonetheless, the court upheld the jury
verdict that under § 1-208 the bank did not have a good faith reason to believe that the
prospect of payment was impaired so as to justify acceleration of the note.
67 See, for example, Van Bibber, 419 NE2d at 124-25; Fort Knox National Bank, 385
SW2d at 198-200.
8 There are obvious parallels between this problem and the controversy over employment at will. See generally William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100
Years of Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L Rev 201 (1985). California is at present the only
state that imposes on employers a general good faith obligation in exercising their termina-
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"At will" language aside, the official comment to § 1-208
clearly dictates that the good faith requirement does not apply to
demand notes. The holding of the court in K.M.C., which equates a
demand provision to an acceleration clause and implies a good
faith obligation, is wrong in this regard. As one court puts it: "The
imposition of a good faith defense to the call for payment of a demand note transcends the performance or enforcement of a contract and in fact adds a term to the agreement which the parties
had not included."69 The court in K.M.C. abused good faith doc70
trine, imposing its own notions of "reasonableness and fairness"
in abrogation of the intention of the parties clear on the face of the
instrument.
In its principal holding, the K.M.C. court interpreted the good
faith obligation to require Irving to give K.M.C. reasonable notification before discontinuing funding of a discretionary line of
credit, absent valid business reasons precluding Irving from so doing.71 The court justified this decision through analogy to UCC § 2309(3), which requires reasonable notification before termination
of a contract.7 21 In particular, the court quoted official comment 8
to § 2-309, stating that "the application of principles of good faith

tion rights. Cleary v American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal App 3d 443, 168 Cal Rptr 722 (1980).
However, Foley v Interactive Data Corp., 184 Cal App 3d 241, 219 Cal Rptr 866 (1986),
currently under review by the California Supreme Court, may limit this doctrine.
Under the present analysis such an obligation should be imposed only if it is within the
reasonable expectations of the parties; it should not be used to override terms of the contract. Given that the good faith obligation in employment at will has been imposed only on
the employer, the critical inquiry is whether the labor market is such as to justify expectations that the employer's termination decision should be more constrained than that of the
employee. The debate thus centers around such issues as unequal bargaining power and the
relative ease with which employees can move from job to job and employers can rehire. See,
for example, Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:The Duty
to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv L Rev 1816 (1980); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 Colum L Rev 1404 (1967); Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U Chi L Rev 947 (1984).
69 Centerre Bank of Kansas City v Distributors,Inc., 705 SW2d 42, 48 (Mo App 1985);
Accord FlagshipNationalBank v Gray DistributionSystems, Inc., 485 S2d 1336, 1340 (Fla
App 1986); Fulton National Bank v Willis Denney Ford,Inc., 269 SE2d 916 (Ga App 1980);
Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators,Inc. v Peoples National Bank, 10 Wash App 530, 518 P2d
734, 738 n 5 (1974); Simon v New Hampshire Savings Bank, 112 NH 372, 296 A2d 913, 915
(1972).
70 K.M.C., 757 F2d at 760.
7' Id at 759.
72 UCC § 2-309(3) provides:
Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event
requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement
dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.
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and sound commercial practice normally call for such notification
of the termination of a going contract relationship as will give the
other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement."
The drafters of the UCC thus made a determination of the reasonable expectations of the parties, absent specific contractual provisions to the contrary. But the UCC drafters made this determination only for sales contracts; its application to loan contracts in
K.M.C. is inappropriate.
No doubt the court believed that the need to "give the other
party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement" is as valid
in loans as in sales, 73 but that empirical assumption may be incorrect. With a discretionary line of credit, as was involved in K.M.C.,
the period between notice and actual termination would allow the
borrower to continue drawing down funds, thus circumventing the
lender's bargained-for discretionary protection against further insecurity. 74 Moreover, as Irving argued, when the discretionary line
of credit is coupled with a demand provision, it would be inconsistent to imply a notice requirement. To force Irving to give K.M.C.
an opportunity to seek alternative financing would be to endanger
the very security interests the demand note gives Irving the right
to protect. At any rate, this is the sort of judgment that the UCC
leaves to the parties.
The K.M.C. court addressed these objections first by erroneously imposing a good faith requirement on demand notes. Second,
the court qualified the notice requirement, stating that funding
could be terminated without notice if doing so involved a "valid
business judgment," defining that expression in terms of reasonableness.7 5 Such a limitation is contrary to the UCC, which imposes
a commercial reasonableness standard in only certain circumstances, most notably in sales. "[T]he absence of a ... burden of
observing 'reasonable commercial standards' on a secured party reflects the code drafters' recognition that sales transactions are
more amenable to establishment of 'reasonable commercial standards' than are the relations between secured parties and debt-

73 See Note, 81 Nw U L Rev at 551-59 (cited in note 23), for an argument that this
analogy is "defensible and logical." Id at 559.
71 Flick and Raplansky, 103 Banking L J at 228 (cited in note 2) suggest that "perhaps
a court would impose a corresponding 'good faith' duty on the borrower to draw down only
those funds actually needed in the ordinary course of its business." This solution only compounds the problem if the imposition of a good faith duty is inappropriate in these situations. Moreover, it does not eliminate the lender's exposure to the excessive extension of
credit that discretionary lending is intended to eliminate.
75 K.M.C., 757 F2d at 761.
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ors." 76 Rather than enforcing a discretionary line of credit agreement as it appeared, the court implied a notice requirement by
analogy to an inapplicable UCC sales provision. Perhaps recognizing that the analogy between loans and sales is flawed, the court
limited the requirement by mandating inquiry into "valid business
77
judgment" in further disregard of the UCC.
2. Due-on-sale and specific default provisions.
As support for its imposition of a good faith requirement on
demand notes, the court in K.M.C. cited Brown v. Avemco Investment Corp.78 In Brown, a loan agreement between Robert Herriford and Avemco contained a due-on-sale clause stating that payment in full on the loan would be due if Herriford, without the
written permission of Avemco, sold or leased the airplane used as
security on the loan. Herriford leased the plane to plaintiffs without Avemco's permission in 1973. Plaintiffs made payments on
Herriford's loan, without objection from Avemco, until 1975, when
plaintiffs exercised their option to buy the plane and offered
Avemco what they believed to be a sufficient amount to pay off
Herriford's debt in full. Avemco refused the tender, and demanded
payment of a larger sum from Herriford within ten days. Without
further negotiations with either Herriford or the plaintiffs, Avemco
repossessed the plane at the end of the ten days and sold it for an
amount substantially larger than that due on the loan. The plaintiffs sued for conversion. 9
The jury found for Avemco, and a Ninth Circuit panel reversed and remanded for failure to instruct the jury on the application of the UCC and equitable principles to acceleration clauses.
On the equitable side, the court believed:
Van Bibber, 419 NE2d at 122.
A recent First Circuit case, applying the good faith obligation to "impure" demand
notes, also deserves mention. In Reid v Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc., 821 F2d 9 (1st
Cir 1987), the loan contract contained a demand note, and in a separate document, specific
provisions of default. The court read these provisions as qualifying the demand note; the
bank could call the loan only following the occurrence of one of the specified events, or in
the good faith belief that it was insecure. Id at 14-15. However, another reading is possible-one that does not nullify the demand note, and is consistent with the expectations of
the parties evident on the face of the instruments. Under this reading, the loan would be
payable on demand and the list of default provisions would describe events that would certainly lead to a demand for repayment, but are not intended to be exclusive. In Reid, the
lender provided the borrower with guidelines for borrower performance, and as a result the
court eliminated a provision of the contract to which both parties explicitly agreed.
78 603 F2d 1367 (9th Cir 1979).
16
'

IS

Id at 1368-69.
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The facts sufficiently suggest the possibility that... the creditor accelerated not out of a reasonable fear of security impairment but rather from an inequitable desire to take advantage
of a technical default. Indeed acceleration because of a lease
executed two years earlier is less clearly defensive and is subject to even more suspicion. 0
In applying the UCC, the court looked to § 1-208. The court
held that the § 1-208 good faith requirement applies to specific default provisions, such as a due-on-sale clause, as well as to general
insecurity provisions. The court reasoned that insecurity clauses
"are designed to protect the creditor," and "are not to be used offensively, e.g., for the commercial advantage of the creditor," and
that the good faith requirement was designed to prevent such
abuse."1
It should be clear by now that the Brown rule is neither supported by the UCC nor the reasonable expectations of the parties.
The official comment to § 1-208 explains that its good faith obligation is intended to apply to contract provisions that might appear
to grant the power of acceleration at the "whim and caprice" of
one party. Specific default provisions, such as the due-on-sale
clause in Brown, do not fall in this category; by definition such
provisions establish specific criteria for default and there is no
need to imply additional terms in order to protect the contract
from invalidation as illusory or indefinite. Nor is there need to look
to community standards to establish the reasonable expectations
of the parties; they are described on the face of the instrument.
While the weight of judicial authority recognizes that the good
faith standard for insecurity clauses does not apply to default
clauses, 2 the Brown decision is not unprecedented. The Utah Supreme Court, in applying § 1-208 to a default-type acceleration
clause, has found that "this statute [§ 1-208] is in harmony with
the principles of equity .... It seems to recognize that acceleration
is a harsh remedy which should be allowed only if there is some
reasonable justification for doing so, such as a good faith belief
80 Id at 1379.
81 Id at 1376, 1379.

82See, for example, Abrego v United Peoples Federal Say. & Loan Assn., 281 Ark 308,
664 SW2d 858 (1984); Brummund v First NationalBank of Clovis, 99 NM 221, 656 P2d 884
(1983); Hersch v Citizens Savings & Loan Assn., 146 Cal App 3d 1002, 1011, 194 Cal Rptr
628 (1983); Layne v Fort Carson Natl. Bank, 655 P2d 856, 857 (Colo App 1982); Matter of
Sutton Invest., Inc., 46 NC App 654, 266 SE2d 686 (1980); Don Anderson Enterprises v
EntertainmentEnterprises, 589 SW2d 70, 73 (Mo App 1979); Crocket v First Federal Say.
and Loan Assn. of Charlotte, 289 NC 620, 224 SE2d 580, 588 (1976).
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that the prospect of payment is impaired."8 3 The court in Brown
gives a similar rationale: acceleration has "draconian consequences
for the debtor," and should be used by the lender only to protect
itself against insecurity, not as an offensive weapon for commercial
advantage when the loan is secure. 8 '
The idea that a specific default provision may be used only as
a shield against insecurity and not as a sword for commercial advantage, such as to capture better interest rates or an increase in
the value of collateral, misunderstands the concerns of the parties
to a loan contract. Default provisions have the obvious property of
protecting the lender's security. But specific default provisions also
serve to lower the information costs associated with the acceleration decision; debtors obtain more favorable terms in other areas in
exchange for a decrease in the lender's costs in determining and
justifying its acceleration decision. For the courts to require a "reasonable" basis for insecurity apart from that agreed to by the parties is to eliminate part of the advantage for which the lender has
bargained.
In addition, the good faith sword vs. shield rule assumes that
an acceleration provision can only serve as protection against insecurity. It places the risk of rising interest rates on the lender. But
changes in the market are as much a potential cost to the lender as
is the possibility that the loan will not be repaid. There is no reason to believe that the lender will not take all of these potential
costs into account in negotiating the terms of the loan agreement.
The mortgagee who has the right to demand repayment when the
mortgaged property is sold has greater protection against rising interest rates, and this advantage will be reflected in more favorable
terms for the borrower. When the courts prevent lenders from using due-on-sale and other default provisions as protection against
changes in the market, they do not eliminate these costs. If not
through default provisions, these costs will be passed on to the
borrower in other ways, such as higher interest rates, variable interest loans, and shorter times to repayment. By proclaiming that
default provisions may only be used for one purpose, the good
faith obligation limits the tools available to contracting parties to

83

Williamson v Wanlass, 545 P2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1976), quoted in Brown, 603 F2d

at 1377. Accord State Bank of Lehi v Woolsey, 565 P2d 413, 417 (Utah 1977).
84 Brown, 603 F2d at 1376. See Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due-On-Sale Clause:
The Case for Adopting Standardsof Reasonableness and Unconscionability,27 Stan L Rev
1109 (1975), for a more complete exposition of the sword vs. shield argument.
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5

REIFICATION

The argument set out here in opposition to a broad interpretation of good faith performance is essentially one of freedom of contract. The parties to a freely-entered agreement are in the best position to assess the relative costs and benefits associated with the
transaction and allocate those costs and benefits in a way that
maximizes the joint product of their venture and thus the welfare
of both parties. Courts should be reluctant to upset this balance
unless ambiguity or incompleteness in the contract clearly requires
reference to external terms. By reifying community standards, the
communitarian view of good faith compels courts to police agreements more aggressively, imposing contractual requirements not in
the contemplation of the parties.
Key to this argument is the assumption of a freely-entered
agreement, which presupposes that the parties have an accurate
perception of contract terms. Fraud and misrepresentation, proscribed even under an abolitionist, subjective conception of good
faith, are therefore sufficient to invalidate a contract. Beyond this,
there may be situations in which one of the parties suffers from
such a relative lack of sophistication that the parties, taken together, are not in the best position to assess the relative costs and
benefits of the contemplated transaction. Whatever the virtues of
this argument in other contexts, it seems of little merit in commercial lending. The plaintiffs in these lender liability cases are businesspeople for whom credit is as common as employees and taxes.
If freedom of contract has any validity it is in the furtherance of
commerce, where we must assume commercial actors enter transactions with their eyes open.
It is not the role of the courts, who are less versed in commerce than the parties, to upset commercial transactions merely
because, in hindsight, one of the parties made a bad deal. In a
marvel of metaphor, a recent decision by Judge Posner makes a
strong case for leaving contracting parties to their own terms:
[The party seeking to get out of the contract] did not seek to
negotiate better terms. He put himself over a barrel; the
courts will not put him upright. He gambled that at the price
he was paying.., he would be able to pay off [his] debt...
85 A similar argument is made in Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical
Reappraisal,18 J L & Econ 293, 311-14 (1975).
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and make a profit for himself. He threw a pair of balanced
dice, and lost, and that is the end of it so far as Indiana law is
concerned. If the courts let him off the hook, it would just
make it more difficult for people in his position to strike deals
they believe are advantageous-that indeed are advantageous
when made, though given the inevitable uncertainties of commercial life (of life, period) a certain percentage go awry. The
less protection [the creditor] has, the less willing it will be to
8 6
extend credit.
A.

Unrequited Costs.

Courts that rewrite contracts by reference to an external good
faith standard impose costs to society as a whole for which there
are insufficient countervailing benefits. When loss is shifted from a
borrower to a lender in contradiction of contract terms, the immediate cost to the lender is balanced by the gain to the borrower; the
wealth transfer, of itself, presents no loss to society. There are,
however, two other costs associated with a communitarian standard of good faith for which there are insufficient offsetting benefits. First, courts make mistakes. Because courts are in an inferior
position relative to commercial actors to assess proper commercial
standards, courts may adopt rules, such as those in K.M.C and
Brown, that misallocate the burdens and benefits that the parties
have already allocated by the express terms of the contract. By
forcing parties into a different arrangement than they had agreed
to, courts can only make both parties worse off. Borrowers may
thus wind up involuntarily paying, through decreased availability
of credit and less attractive credit terms, for protection from lenders' arbitrary action. Similar costs would be imposed from mistakes
in the other direction if, as seems unlikely, courts were to excessively reduce the restrictions placed on lenders.
A second unrequited cost of court interference is the wasteful
litigation produced when courts demonstrate their willingness to
rewrite contracts and create vague and inconsistent rules. The recent explosive growth in borrower-lender litigation is a direct result of the expansion in successful theories of lender liability. Judicial activism in contract interpretation creates uncertainty in the
market, with resultant costs to all concerned. When lenders legitimately fear that any attempt to call a loan will result in litigation,

" Amoco

Oil Co. v Ashcroft, 791 F2d 519, 524 (7th Cir 1986).
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both lenders and borrowers are the losers.87
B. The Bad Faith Tort.
Another danger in viewing good faith as a broad moral obligation is that it erodes the line between contract and tort. Community standards are part of the contract in that they inform contract
terms. Breach of the duty to perform in good faith is thus breach
of contract, and breach of the duty to perform in good faith cannot
support an action in tort.
To date, use of the tort cause of action for bad faith performance has been limited primarily to the insurance context,88 where
concern for the traditional lack of compensation for non-monetary
suffering in contract damages has been heightened by the special
nature of the insurance contract-that it is a contract entered into
specifically to achieve peace of mind. 9 In effect, the imposition of
tort damages in these cases works to deter insurance companies
from breaching the contract in situations where the insured would
otherwise have insufficient incentive to litigate the issue. Awarding
attorney's fees to the winning party in insurance contract litigation
seems a more efficient solution to this problem.
In the employment area, some courts have reinforced the abrogation of the contract at will through the use of the good faith
obligation, 0 with the imposition of punitive damages for abuse of
discretionary authority.9 1 Query whether abuse of discretion in emThanks to Richard Craswell for the preceding tripartite analysis.
See generally Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Into the Commercial Realm, 86 Colum L Rev 377 (1986); Bank's Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of
Good Faith and FairDealing, 55 ALR4th 1026 (1987); Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of
Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance
Transactions?64 Marq L Rev 425 (1981); Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 Cal L Rev 1291 (1985).
88 There are two categories of bad faith tort in insurance. The first successful use of the
tort cause of action arose in third party insurance cases, where insurance companies were
held liable in tort for failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer from third party plaintiffs. See, for example, Comunale v Traders & General Insurance Co., 50 Cal 2d 654, 328
P2d 198 (1958); Crisci v Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal 2d 425, 426 P2d 173 (1967); Lange v
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 290 Minn 61, 185 NW2d 881 (1971). The second category
of bad faith tort is in first party insurance cases, where the insurer fails to pay the insured
as per the insurance contract. See, for example, Gruenberg v Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal 3d 566,
510 P2d 1032 (1973); United Services Auto Assn. v Werley, 526 P2d 28 (Alaska 1974);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v Peterson,91 Nev 617, 540 P2d 1070 (1975); Anderson
v Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis 2d 675, 271 NW2d 368 (1978).
87

88

90 See note 68.

91See, for example, Smithers v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 139 Cal App 3d
643, 189 Cal Rptr 20 (1983); Cleary v American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal App 3d 443, 168 Cal

19881

What's So Good About Good Faith?

1363

ployment differs in any principled way from other breach of
contract.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv. v Standard Oil Co. 9 2 represents a potentially disastrous expansion of the bad faith tort into the commercial realm. In
Seaman's Direct, the court held that an oil company that not only
breached the contract, but also denied that a valid contract existed, was liable in tort as well as contract. The court first warned,
correctly, that it would be "wise to proceed with caution" in applying tort remedies to commercial contracts because "it may be difficult to distinguish between breach of the covenant and breach of
contract, and there is the risk that interjecting tort remedies will
intrude upon the expectations of the parties."93 Nonetheless, the
court established a rule that "a party may incur tort remedies
when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself
from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause,
' 94
that the contract exists.
The difficulty with this formulation is that "there is no principled distinction between a denial that a contract exists-a denial
of any liability on the contract-and a denial that a portion of a
contract, or certain terms under the contract, exists."9 5 That is,
there is no reason the Seaman's Direct tort could not be applied
by courts to all contract cases. Such complete subversion of the
expectation damages standard would indeed represent the death of
contract.
Another area in which the good faith tort has been applied to
commercial contracts is the wrongful repossession of collateral. In
Alaska Statebank v Fairco,9 6 for example, the Supreme Court of
Alaska held that punitive damages could be awarded where
Statebank had repossessed Fairco's property without a good faith
belief that Fairco was in default. Other courts have reached similar
decisions. These cases are distinguishable from other good faith
cases in which tort damages are inappropriate. In the wrongful repossession cases, the defendant took affirmative action against the
plaintiff's property, instead of merely failing to perform some obiRptr 722 (1980); Gates v Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont 304, 668 P2d 213 (1983).
92 36 Cal 3d 752, 686 P2d 1158 (1984).
,3 Seaman's Direct, 686 P2d at 1167.
" Id.
Note, 86 Colum L Rev at 401 (cited in note 88).
674 P2d 288, 296-97 (Alaska 1983).
97 First National Bank in Libby v Twombly, 213 Mont 66, 689 P2d 1226 (1984);
Compton v Craeger Trucking Co., Inc., 282 Or 521, 579 P2d 1297 (1978).
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gation or demanding repayment. Absent an honest (i.e., good faith)
belief that such action is within one's contractual rights, taking
possession of another's property without the owner's consent is
tortious. Note, however, that the good faith standard here is
subjective.
IV.

POLICING EGREGIOUS BEHAVIOR

Having dispossessed courts of the ability to rewrite contracts,
it is nonetheless the case that some contract performance behavior
is so clearly outside the bounds of decency and fairness that it
should be prohibited even if not explicitly disallowed by the contract. How is this goal to be achieved while minimizing the costs
associated with a communitarian conception of good faith? The
UCC provides explicitly for the application of equitable principles
in appropriate cases:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent,
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions.9 8
The course of dealing or performance between parties may act
as a modification of the contract, allowing courts to apply equitable principles in order to impose new duties or prevent one party
from engaging in opportunistic behavior. Such a solution is superior to the imposition of a broad good faith obligation for several
reasons. First, there is an established body of equitable doctrine;
courts and consumers of the law have some basic understanding of
what it normally requires to waive a contractual right. A communitarian conception of good faith, by reference to "community standards of decency and fairness," adds costly uncertainty to transactions. Second, equitable solutions are fact bound. The parties to a
specific transaction may, through their own behavior, modify their
agreement. Thus, courts need not create inefficient rules contrary
to the intention of the parties, as in K.M.C. and Brown, in order to
police egregious behavior.
Most important, by using equitable principles rather than a
broad conception of good faith to decide the egregious cases, courts
will show greater deference to contract terms. When community
standards are an implied term in every contract, it is too easy for

's UCC § 1-103.
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judges and juries to apply their own conceptions of fairness and
decency. The principles of equity come into play in a much smaller
class of cases. The danger that waiver and estoppel will become as
much of a loose cannon as good faith is minimized by the presumption, under an abolitionist conception, that courts generally
are to leave contracting parties free to order their own
relationships.
The German experience underscores by contrast the proper
role of equity in American courts. Article 242 of the German Civil
Code, like the UCC, imposes a duty to perform all obligations in
good faith."' The two provisions have had very different histories,
however. During the period of rampant inflation following World
War I, good faith became a tool for the German courts to rewrite
contracts in order to avoid injustices in debt repayment. 10 0 The use
of good faith as an "equity reserve" was generalized to other situations in which the courts began playing an active role in implying
contractual terms and obligations. '10 The success of this enterprise
in Germany has been dependent upon the German commitment to
a grand design for a legal order, and to a constant and active interchange between German courts and German legal academics
and professionals. 10 2 The utility of such a scheme in the much
larger and more heterogeneous American legal system is suspect.
In Germany, the broad good faith obligation of Article 242 has produced an extensive and well-understood body of law. In American
courts, the behavior proscribed by Article 242 is substantially handled by the UCC and existing principles of common law and equity. For example, the German courts have derived the principle of
estoppel from the good faith clause. 0 3 Similarly, the difficulties
caused by post-War inflation may have been handled by the impracticability and frustration doctrines of the common law and the
UCC.'0 4
The K.M.C. and Brown decisions were no doubt motivated by
the obvious abuses committed by the lender in each case. But
lender liability may have been established in both K.M.C. and

" John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 Harv L Rev
1041, 1044 (1976).
110Id at 1044-45.
101 Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 Current Legal Problems 16, 32 (1956);
Dawson, 89 Harv L Rev at 1045.
102 Dawson, 89 Harv L Rev at 1123, 1126.
103

Id at 1124.

Powell, 9 Current Legal Problems at 33-35 (cited in note 101); Gillette, 1981 Duke L
J at 646-47 (cited in note 28).
104
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Brown without recourse to the good faith obligation, and without
limiting the ability of future borrowers and lenders to reach agreements in their best interest. In K.M.C., the course of dealing between the parties (in which Irving had on several occasions continued funding under similar circumstances), Irving's well-known
practice of providing notice to other borrowers, and K.M.C.'s reliance on its good relations with Irving, might have acted as a waiver
of Irving's right to change its criteria without notifying K.M.C.
In Brown, the plaintiffs had leased the airplane and made payments on Herriford's loan for two years without objection from
Avemco. Avemco then repossessed the plane without notice and
without negotiating with plaintiffs concerning an amount of money
the plaintiffs believed sufficient to pay off the loan. The court used
the good faith obligation to establish the general rule that secured
creditors may not repossess collateral following default in order to
make a profit. A less dangerous holding would have been that
Avemco, through its course of dealings with the plaintiffs, waived
its right to repossess without notifying the plaintiffs and allowing
them to negotiate over repayment of the loan. 1°5
Such a use of equitable principles to create a duty to notify is
well established in repossession cases. For example, in Nevada National Bank v Huff,""6 the Supreme Court of Nevada held that a
lender who regularly accepts late payments is estopped from suddenly declaring a default and repossessing collateral without first
notifying the borrower that strict compliance with the terms of the
agreement will henceforth be demanded. 07
In Skeels v Universal C.LT. Credit Corp.,108 a Third Circuit
panel seemed to equate the good faith obligation with the principles of equity. Citing both UCC § 1-203 and § 1-103, the court held
that a lender who had knowledge that the borrower had defaulted
on loan payments, but who continued to make assurances that further advances of operating capital were forthcoming, could not re105 Similarly, in employment-at-will cases the California courts may be applying good
faith where the same result could be reached under equitable principles without imposing a
term that may be beyond the expectations of the parties. In Cleary, for example, the court
held that "the longevity of the employee's service, together with the expressed policy of the
employer, operate[d] as a form of estoppel. . . ." 111 Cal App 3d at 456. It was thus unnecessary for the court to impose a good faith obligation when the parties, by their own conduct, had already created certain extra-contractual obligations.
106 94 Nev 506, 582 P2d 364, 369 (1978).
107 Id at 369; Accord Pierce v Leasing Intern., Inc., 142 Ga App 371, 235 SE2d 752, 754
(1977); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v Shelton, 645 F2d 869, 873 (10th Cir 1981); Alaska
Statebank v Fairco, 674 P2d 288, 292 (Alaska 1983).
108 335 F2d 846, 851 (3rd Cir 1964).
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possess collateral without notifying the borrower. The lender's behavior here acted as a modification of the contract and a waiver of
its right to repossess without notice. Given that the case could be
decided on narrow equity grounds, the court's reference to a general good faith obligation is superfluous.
V.

THE PROPER USE OF THE GOOD FAITH OBLIGATION

When a lender accelerates repayment of a loan or proceeds
against a borrower's collateral, it does so under the authority of
one of three general types of contractual provisions: a specific condition of default, a general insecurity clause, or a demand provision. Demand provisions and specific conditions of default both declare on their face the reasonable expectations of the parties.
There is no need to appeal to notions of fairness or decency, or to
look to a background understanding, when the parties to such
agreements have negotiated their own solution to a complex
problem. 10 9
Insecurity clauses are similar to open-price or output and requirement contracts in sales; it is necessary to supply some additional meaning to the terms of contracts that clearly do not contemplate unbound discretion. A court must look beyond the
explicit terms in order to enforce the contract according to the reasonable expectations of the parties. The UCC imposes an objective
good faith obligation on the party with discretion in each of these
cases. 11 0 The UCC does not impose a good faith obligation-aside
from subjective "honesty in fact"-on a party calling a demand
note or accelerating upon a specific condition of default.
This comment has been an extended argument that the UCC
rules are substantially correct and that courts should follow them.
That so many courts have rewritten contracts rather than enforced
the reasonable expectations of the parties is largely a result of an
overbroad conception of the good faith obligation. Therefore, the
following propositions regarding the proper use of good faith are
offered.
"' "[Courts] might resort to considerations of fairness or justice to interpret or supply
terms when the intentions of the parties or their reasonable expectations cannot be reasonably ascertained. But it is hard to see what justifies a court in discarding the agreement of
parties on grounds of 'contractual morality' when the intentions of the parties or their reasonable expectations can be reasonably ascertained.. . ." Burton, 69 Iowa L Rev at 499-500
(cited in note 36).
1 See UCC §§ 2-305, 2-306, 2-311(1), 1-208 (quoted in note 50). It is an open question
whether the good faith obligation in § 1-208 is objective or subjective, but it should work as
an objective standard in practice. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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1.

Show great deference to the express terms of the contract, as
read in ordinary English; do not appeal to principles of fairness or decency to interpret a contract when the contract is
clear on its face or the intention of the parties is clear from
the evidence.
This is merely another version of the rule recited earlier that good
faith should never be used to overturn the express terms of a contract. It is a principle consistent with the philosophy of the UCC"'
and the general tenets of contract law. 1 2 The fundamental danger
in the reification of community standards is its presumption that
in all cases there are external standards to which courts must look.
2.

Protect the externally determined, objectively reasonable expectations of the parties when the terms of the contract and
the evidence of the parties' intentions are ambiguous.
Again, this is a fundamental principle of contract interpretation. 1113
The obligation to perform in good faith is unnecessary to its application. In those cases in which courts must impose external standards, it is important that they do so in line with the realities of
the environment in which the transaction has taken place. In commercial lending, the reasonable expectations of the parties include
the ability to trade off the costs of information and uncertainty.
3.

Use appropriatelegal and equitable theories to impose liability on parties exhibiting egregious behavior; do not rewrite

" At least one commentator takes this view of the UCC general good faith provision:
"[Section 1-203] in effect states that what is not regulated by the contract should be done
in such a way as to show good faith in the carrying out of what is expressed." 1 Ronald A.
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203:3 at 165 (Lawyers Co-op, 2d ed 1970) (emphasis added), cited in Flagship National Bank v Gray Distribution Systems, Inc., 485 S2d
1336, 1340 (Fla App 1986), and Fulton National Bank v Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga
App 846, 269 SE2d 916, 918 (1980).
Moreover, UCC § 1-205(4) provides:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of
trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when
such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and
usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
12 "IT]he courts reiterate the well-established principle that it is not the function of
the judiciary to change the obligations of a contract which the parties have seen fit to make.
... [Affter interpretation has called to its aid all those facts which make up the environment and setting in which the words are used, the words themselves remain the best and
most important evidence of intention." Walter H. E. Jaeger, 4 Williston on Contracts §
610A at 513-14 (Baker, Voorhis, 3d ed 1961) (footnotes omitted); "Most of what usually we
think of as 'contract law' consists of a legal framework within which parties may create their
own rights and duties by agreement." E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.1 at 445 (Little,
Brown, 1982).
113 See note 45 and accompanying text.
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contracts via a vague conception of good faith.
If courts adhere to proposition 1 there will be less call for any external standards, including principles of equity. Nonetheless, fair is
fair; and some contract performance behavior is unfair even under
existing doctrine. The danger with using good faith to police this
behavior is the uncertainty it adds to transactions. It is one thing
for a lender to live by the rule that repeated assurances that a loan
will not be called may act as a waiver of the ability to demand
repayment absent any change in material circumstances, it is quite
another for the law to declare that a demand note does not require
payment on demand, or that due on sale does not mean due on
sale.
Communitarians object to a narrow conception of good faith
because they believe that courts must look to community standards of fairness and decency in order to control overreaching and
opportunistic contract performance. But fairness is the sine qua
non of equity, and equity has the advantage of well-established
principles and fact-bound solutions.
4. Eliminate the term good faith when an objective reasonableness standard is meant.
In those cases where a court will have to impose an objective standard in order to enforce a contract, it may do so without invoking
the good faith obligation. The intentions of the framers of the
UCC would be more faithfully executed were every reference to an
objective good faith standard replaced with some variant of the
word "reasonable."
5. Abolish the duty to perform in good faith generally.
When the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business
Law recommended that the UCC restrict good faith to subjective
honesty in fact, they recognized such a move might make a general
obligation to perform in good faith unnecessary." 4 They were correct. The law of fraud already imposes on every party to a contract
the duty to perform honestly. Putting another label on this doctrine gives the courts a weapon, not intended by the UCC but very
real in its effects, with which to override the intentions of the parties and create uncertainty among the consumers of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding may appear to be a protracted example of the

'21 Malcolm, 6 Bus Law at 128 (cited in note 24).
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naturalistic fallacy. By calling for the elimination of the presumption to look to community standards that is imbedded in the good
faith obligation and allowing the terms of a contract to control,
even when they violate standards of decency and fairness, it might
seem this comment has argued that duties and obligations should
be entirely within the discretion of contracting parties. Putting
aside that there is much of this fallacy in the very nature of contract law, this comment may be viewed not as under the grip of a
fallacy, but as embracing a conscious belief that the market is a
better place to work out commercial standards than are the courts
or the legislature. 115 The market is complex, and contracts form an
essential part of its operation. Until the courts know more than the
parties about the market and the factors that influence'contracts,
they should leave the market alone, rather than impose their own
conceptions of decency and fairness.
This is not to say that the market will eliminate all contract
performance behavior that might be deemed indecent or unfair.
We have principles of law and equity designed to curb specific
forms of unfairness, and they should be enforced. The obligation to
perform in good faith is a "super-eminent principle" that allows
courts to attack indecent, unfair, and immoral behavior generally.
To communitarians, such a principle is needed to curb numerous
forms of bad faith behavior that are not proscribed by existing
doctrine. This comment has argued that the benefits of such an
attempt to equate the law with morality are outweighed by the
costs.

"I See the quotation from the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, in text at note 25.

